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Introduction1 
 
Tracings its roots to the 1960s, environmental politics is approaching middle age. 
Although groups, societies and civilizations have been co-evolving with their natural 
environments throughout the history of humankind, modern nation states have only 
recognized the environmental problem as a political issue since the beginning of the 1960s. 
On an evolutionary or even historical time scale this is a very brief period, but it might 
nevertheless be tempting to think about environmental politics and policies as a yet another 
iteration in the ongoing process of adaptation to limits posed by the natural resource base. The 
difference might be that this time around, human and social adaptation to ecological limits is 
predominantly to be achieved within the framework of one of modernity’s more peculiar 
inventions – the nation state. Although environmental politics displays a gradual migration 
from national to international policy arenas, the nation state is still the primary site for 
environmental management. Despite often voiced claims of environmental degradation as a 
prime example of globalized problems of the modern age, it is still nation states that manage 
or mismanage natural resources, reduce or increase emissions of harmful substances into air, 
water, and soils, stimulate or repress environmentally beneficial behaviour among their 
citizens, and choose to cooperate or defect from international environmental treaties. Since 
the nation state remains the primary mode of social and political organization and decision-
making, it is important to understand how different aspects of this form of political 
organization affects the ability to address problems of environmental degradation. 
 
For that purpose, this paper argues and outlines an institution-centred approach to the 
comparative study of environmental politics. This approach is based on the assumption that 
most environmental problems can be described as a conflict between collective and individual 
rationality to be found on all levels of society, ranging from interactions between individuals 
(e.g. recycling household waste) to international relations between states (e.g. international 
treaties and conventions such as the Kyoto protocol) (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990, 1998, 
Rothstein 2000, Sandler 2004). In practical settings, these environmental “social traps” 
(Rothstein 2000) can take on many concrete forms, ranging from difficulties in securing 
widespread participation in household waste recycling schemes to limited participation among 
nations in the Kyoto Protocol treaty. At the heart of all these cases of collective action 
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problems is a profound difficulty of externalization of environmental costs: the inability to 
secure environmental collective action means that no single actor picks up the tab for 
environmental degradation. If environmental problems can be understood as fundamentally 
rooted in the difficulties of sustaining collective action, be it on group-, local- regional-, 
national-, or international political scales, then we should expect co-operation-facilitating 
factors such as well-functioning institutions and  trustful norms and networks to be highly 
influential for progress in addressing environmental collective dilemmas. Societies equipped 
with transparent, non-corrupted, effective, Weberian-type state institutions and higher levels 
of social capital among its citizenry, should, all other things being equal, be more successful 
in combating environmental degradation than countries with weak institutions and widespread 
norms of distrust. Put differently, good institutions and high levels of social trust make a 
society more capable, and therefore more likely, to pick up the environmental tab.  
 
This paper seeks to outline and discuss an institution-centred analytical framework for 
the study of the environmental performance of states.  The paper starts off with a short 
discussion of previous research on environmental politics in a comparative perspective, 
identifies its limitations, and proceeds to outline an institution-based framework for the 
analysis of environmental performance. The concluding section discusses different 









Previous research  
Theories of how social and political factors influence the ability of states to govern the 
environment are in short supply. In comparison with the large amount of scholarly effort 
devoted to the question of how political factors influence, for example, economic growth, 
processes of democratization, and the emergence of welfare regimes, theoretical 
understanding of variation in environmental governance among countries is clearly 
underdeveloped. There is however two major theoretical approaches that have been applied to 
the questions of environmental governance: Ecological Modernization Theory and the 
“Ecological Kuznets Curve Theory”.2 Both these theoretical approaches focus heavily on 
economic factors for explaining societal impacts on the natural environment. The key notion 
is that the relationship between market economy and environmental degradation can be 
thought of as curve-linear rather than linear viewed over time. Economies in early stages of 
industrialisation rely heavily on extraction of natural resources for growth generation and 
therefore have a large impact on ecological systems. This phase of economic development is 
also marked by use of inefficient and crude technologies that generate further environmental 
damage. This relationship between nature and economy persists until a certain point of 
economic wealth is reached, beyond which the curve starts to slope downwards. In this new 
phase, economic growth is increasingly generated through production of services and the 
development of new technologies which lessens the need for extraction of crude natural 
resources. In addition, some scholars have argued that inhabitants in more affluent societies 
start to value other things than material wealth (Inglehart 1995; Welzel et al. 2003) a process 
that again serves to weaken the relationship between economic growth and environmental 
degradation. The Environmental Kuznets Curve theory has not gone unchallenged, and some 
authors argue that it is only valid for a small class of environmental impacts (local air 
pollutants related to energy production) and that it might not be applicable to developing 
countries (Raymond 2004; Dinda 2004).  
In a similar vein, Ecological Modernization Theory takes its point of departure in the 
changing relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation purportedly 
visible in advanced industrial states and argues that it creates new conditions for 
environmental protection. Ecological Modernization theory is less concerned with explaining 
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differences in environmental performance between countries than it is with exploring new 
forms of environmental governance that follow in the wake of the de-coupling of economic 
growth and environmental impacts. Specifically, the reduced opposition between economic 
welfare and environmental protection means that environmental governance no longer 
requires heavy-handed state intervention to regulate a zero-sum game between economic 
growth and environmental protection (See Goldstone (2002) and York and Rosa (2003)). 
Economic growth, the evolution of the market economy, and technological developments are 
no doubt highly important sources of environmental impact, and are thus important objects of 
study. However, Environmental Kuznets Curve theory and Ecological Modernization theory 
has relatively little to offer when it come to understanding political aspects of environmental 
management, and we now turn to a discussion of studies that have focussed on finding 
political determinants of environmental performance.  
 
Most of the studies in the field of comparative environmental politics have been carried 
out in the form of small-N case studies (Scruggs 2003; Easty and Porter 2005). In contrast, 
only a handful of large-N studies that explicitly link social, institutional, and political factors 
on the one hand and environmental impacts on the other can be found in the literature. In an 
early study of eighteen countries, Crepaz demonstrated a strong relationship between 
corporatism and the reduction of air pollutants (Crepaz 1995). This result is also reached in a 
study by Jahn, using an index of relative emission reductions in eighteen OECD countries 
(Jahn 1998). Both Jahn and Crepaz argue that the superior environmental record of 
corporatism is due to its ability to provide institutions and procedures for reaching agreements 
between elite actors. Turner (1998) finds evidence of a relationship between constitutional 
rules and deforestation rates of rain forests in a study of 58 countries. One of the few 
empirical studies performed on the topic the impact of democracy on the environment 
uncovered evidence of a negative relationship between democracy and CO2 emissions, soil 
erosion, and deforestation, but no positive environmental effects of democracy (Midlarsky 
1998). Meyer et al. (2003) finds a correlation between institutional factors and deforestation 
rates in a study of 117 countries, the most notable effect being a strong correlation between 
corruption and loss of forest cover. The negative environmental impact of corruption is 
corroborated in a study by Welsch (2004). The importance of institutional factors is also 
suggested by a study of institutional arrangements and relative reductions of environmentally 
harmful industrial emissions in a sample of eighteen industrialized countries (Duit 2002, ch. 
4), in which an earlier and more comprehensive institutionalization of the environmental issue 
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was found to correlate with measures of environmental performance. Grafton and Knowles 
investigate the impact of social capital defined as both interpersonal trust, membership in 
voluntary organisations (termed civic social capital by the authors), and public social capital 
(institutional quality) on national environmental performance (estimated through indicators 
from the ESI data set) in a study of 53 countries. The authors find little statistical evidence in 
support for the assertion that social capital is always better for the environment and argues 
that population growth is a more relevant factor to consider (Grafton and Knowles 2004). In a 
study of 21 OECD countries, Neumayer argues that he has found a robust effect of the 
strength of green/left-wing liberal parties on emission reduction, but no effects of corporatist 
structures (Neumayer 2003). A highly interesting recent study by Esty and Porter (2005) 
argues that countries that are more competitive on the world market also tend to have a better 
environmental performance record. The authors argue that the reason for this result is that 
factors conducive to national competitiveness also stimulate a better environmental 
performance, which in turn means that economic competitiveness and environmental 
performance does not necessarily present conflicting goals. Finally, the perhaps most 
comprehensive work on the subject of cross-national environmental performance can be 
found in Lyle Scrugg’s Sustaining Abundance (2003). Scruggs uses a sample of seventeen 
industrialized democracies for which he constructs an index of environmental performance to 
serve as dependent variable. As in his earlier studies (1999, 2001) Scruggs finds that 
corporatism, higher per capita income and more centralized democratic institutions are 
positively related to environmental performance. Interestingly, no significant linkages are 
found between a more environmentally minded public opinion and better environmental 
outcomes.   
 
The black box of environmental performance 
In sum, not very much is known about the preconditions for better and worse 
environmental performance in a cross-national perspective. Results from previous research 
present a scattered and sometimes contradictory overall picture. If one is to single out one 
reoccurring finding, it seems that corporatist schemes of interest representation and possibly a 
more consensual type of democracy has been beneficial for a higher level of environmental 
performance, at least for the reduction of point source emissions among Western 
industrialized countries (Scruggs, 1999, 2001, 2003; Neumayer 2003, Jahn 1998; Crepaz 
1995).  This rather limited bulk of knowledge has multiple causes, such as limited and 
varying selection of cases and highly unreliable and differing measures of environmental 
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impacts as well as socio-political factors, but more than anything, its limitations are due to the 
absence of a theoretical approach to the empirical question of understanding variation in 
environmental performance. Furthermore, it is warranted to talk about one large gap, or black 
box, common to almost all the available scientific work on environmental performance in a 
cross-national perspective. This black box contains the environmental policy process: what 
are the political and societal factors associated with a more ambitious environmental policy, 
how is environmental policy translated into policy output (i.e. emission reductions, habitat 
preservation, and resource management), and how does this output affect the state of 
environmental resources? Most cross-national studies of environmental performance have 
paid little attention to the policy process itself, and have typically proceeded directly to search 
for correlations between structural-level factors and various environmental impacts. This 
tendency of environmental research can in part be explained by the lack of comparative 
measures or estimates of environmental policy, but it nevertheless means that we have little or 
no knowledge of more general patters of how environmental policy is generated, adopted, and 
implemented, and how it in turn affects the environmental performance of states. 
Furthermore, the omission of the policy process in comparative research makes it difficult to 
develop more precise causal arguments necessary to provide a link between structural traits 
and environmental impacts.  
 
Compared to other more traditional areas of comparative political research, such as 
studies on the origins and configurations of welfare state policy (cf P. Pierson 2000) or the 
creation of economic prosperity (Feng 2003), the relative dearth of environmental policy 
studies stands out as even more salient. Another contrast can be made to the study of 
institutions and management of small-scale environmental resources (so called Common Pool 
Resources). This line of research has generated an impressive bulk of information on how the 
interaction of collective action problems, resource characteristics, and institutional designs 
determine the sustainability of resource usage (Agrawal 2003; Ostrom 1990, 2005). A 
defining feature of all these examples of research traditions is that they are firmly secured 
within a theoretical framework, which means that empirical research can be directed and 
cumulative to a much larger extent. Simply put, we have, at best, a very limited knowledge 
about institutional, political, and social preconditions necessary for a better environmental 
performance of states. One minimal requirement for addressing this dearth is to put available 
(and, if needed, new) social science theories to work in the endeavour to understand the 
interaction between politics and environmental performance (Lundqvist 1978).  
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Theorizing environmental performance 
As stated above, the point of departure for this project is that most instances of  
environmental degradation is rooted in profound difficulties with securing collective action 
required for addressing those problems. This statement is however too broad to be analytically 
useful as it overshadows important dissimilarities between environmental problems stemming 
from the fact that there are several types of collective action problems. In a most general 
sense, a healthy natural environment is a public good. Following Ostrom et al. (1994) a basic 
distinction can be made between provisioning problems and appropriation problems of 
securing a public good. Provisioning problems has to do with the provision of a public good, 
such as building, financing, and maintaining an irrigation system or a waste recycling system 
in a city. Appropriation problems are problems related to the use of limited resources, such as 
withdrawals of water from a ground water basin or timber from a forest. Many environmental 
problems can be seen as being both provisioning and appropriation problems. For example, 
air pollution can be seen as a problem of implementing and maintaining a system for 
monitoring and sanctioning of emissions, or as a case of controlling withdrawals from a 
limited resource of clean air. The point to be made here is that both provisioning and 
appropriation problems create environmental externalities (cf Paavola & Adger 2005). 
 
Environmental economists have long argued that environmental degradation is a case of 
externalisation of environmental costs (Baumol 1975). Price signals on the market do not 
fully reflect environmental costs associated with production and transportation of market 
goods, which in turn creates unsustainable consumption patterns. If a certain good is under-
priced or even free, it can be expected to be over-used. If prices could be made to reflect 
correctly the full environmental costs associated with the production of market goods, 
environmental degradation would not be an issue. The trick is thus to internalize 
environmental cost, i.e. to make producers and consumers pay the full price for the 
environmental goods and services they are utilizing (c f Costanza et.al 2000; Stavins and 
Whitehead 1997). Traditionally, this has been addressed as a question of getting the 
incentives right, either in terms of correctly valuing the environmental costs or as a question 
of stimulating a certain frequency of the desired behaviour among agents.  
In the present context the term “internalization of environmental externalities” is used 
with a slightly different meaning, which perhaps is best explained by analogy to another more 
established field of political inquiry; the study of the welfare state. A long-standing issue 
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within welfare state research is whether the welfare state should be primarily understood as a 
protection against the brutal forces of the market economy, or as an integral part of the market 
economy, necessary for its functionality (C. Pierson 1992, P. Pierson 2000). Some theorists 
pursuing the latter line of reasoning have argued that the welfare state can be understood as a 
institutional response created to counterbalance the effects of the market’s externalizations of 
social and human costs (Therborn 1987). No actor operating on a perfectly “free market” will 
be willing to pay the price for things such as education, health care, justice system, social 
security, and child care, despite the fact that the market itself needs such services in order to 
secure long-term functionality. The solution, according to this (inherently functional) theory, 
has historically consisted in the state taking on the task of providing these services, usually 
financed through some sort of redistributive taxation scheme. Transferring this line of 
reasoning to the realm of environmental degradation (another form of market externalization), 
state responses to environmental management could be seen as an attempt to counterbalance 
the environmental effects of the market’s wealth creation. Environmental performance of 
states can thus be defined as the extent to which a state is able to produce environmental 
public goods. These public goods can vary over scales, from protecting key habitats of 
endangered species in a local setting to reductions of greenhouse gases for the betterment of 
the global ecological system. Thus, the production of environmental public goods always 
entails a process of internalizing previously externalized environmental costs. As most forms 
of environmental degradation involves large numbers of actors with no or little incentive to 
unilaterally pay environmental costs, the process of internalizing environmental costs is likely 
to give rise to multiple collective action dilemmas. Previous research has shown that factors 
such as norms of cooperation and trust (social capital) and institutional quality are pivotal for 
the resolution of large-scale collective action dilemmas. It can therefore be assumed that in 
explaining variations among states in the capacity to address the dilemmas lodged in 
environmental management, social capital and institutional quality must be considered as 
important explanatory factors.  
 
Social capital and environmental performance 
 
During the 1990s, the notion of social capital has gained a central position within social 
science – some would say undeservingly, other find it to be the most significant theoretical 
development of social theory during the last two decades (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003). 
Furthermore, the meaning of the concept is highly ambiguous, and there has been substantial 
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debate on what is actually meant by the term social capital, not to mention how it should be 
investigated and measured. Most observers would however agree on the importance and 
relevance of what could be considered the core of social capital – the idea that trustful 
relations (vertically between citizens and government, horizontally among citizens), and 
dense organizational networks on citizen level has profound implications on the ability of the 
community to resolve conflicts, implement policy, and most importantly; produce and 
maintain collective goods. (c.f. Putnam, 1990, 2000; Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000). Social 
capital has been defined as ”the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and 
expectations about patterns of interaction that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent 
activity” (Ostrom, 2000, p. 176). Scholarly interest in the notion of social capital is largely 
due to empirical results indicating a connection between social capital and more optimal 
social outcomes. Economies with high levels of social capital seem to be more flourishing 
(Dasgupta & Seregaldin 1999); democratic participation (Inglehart, 1999) and governance 
tend to be more effective and dynamic (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Newton, 1999). The active 
ingredient in social capital seems to be trust; the level of trust in fellow citizens and trust in 
institutions is thought to be decisive for the level of collaboration in large scale collective 
dilemmas (Levi & Braithwaite 1998, Offe, 1999). There are many different suggestions as to 
what type of trust is the more important, as well as for how we can understand why trust 
facilitates cooperation in society (Hobson, 2004). One dividing issue is whether trust in 
generalized others or trust in society’s institutions is the most important for achieving large 
scale cooperation (Rothstein & Stolle 2003). Another issue of debate is whether social capital 
is produced through participation in involuntary organisations or if such organisations should 
rather be seen as the product of social capital (Stolle, 1998, 2003). Based on discoveries of the 
crucial role played by social capital in overcoming collective action problems in many other 
policy areas, it has been suggested that there are strong reasons to expect a similar function 
for social capital in combating the collective dilemma of environmental degradation (Pretty & 
Ward, 2001).  
The apparent question is thus how different aspects of social capital are connected to 
environmental performance of states: what causal paths are conceivable? Countries with 
higher levels of social capital should be able to benefit from this in roughly two ways. First, 
implementing policy, and especially the kind of policies that require broad scale cooperation 
among large portions of the populations (i.e. reduction of green house gases by changes in 
personal transport patterns, recycling household waste), should, relatively speaking, be easier 
in societies where trust and organizational networks are more frequent. If citizen A is to start 
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recycling her household waste, she has to have some confidence in her fellow citizens doing 
likewise. If this confidence in unknown others is lacking, citizen A will require more 
compelling incentives and more stringent third-party monitoring to start recycling, which in 
turn makes the task of implementing waste recycling schemes more taxing for the state.  
Second, citizens in high-trusting political cultures can be assumed to be in a better position to 
initiate and implement environmental cooperation schemes of their own. In other words, self-
organization is more likely to occur in societies where levels of social capital are higher. 
Although it is unlikely that cross-national analysis using aggregate data will be able to 
distinguish between these two different effects, the scenarios suggest plausible causal paths 
for the effect of trust on environmental performance.  
 
The legacy and quality of institutions  
 
Another strong theoretical current in contemporary social science stems from the idea of 
the pivotal role of the institution in explaining policy outcomes (Hall 1996). Advances in 
research on institutions can be applied to the question of variation in environmental 
performance along two routes. The first route acknowledges the significance of a historical 
analysis of institutional evolution to estimate institutional effects on environmental capacity. 
This approach suggests that an analysis of the historical trajectories of environmental 
institutions based on theoretical notions such as, institutional stickiness, path dependency, and 
formative moments, (North, 1990, Arthur 1994; Pierson 2000a and 2000b; Torfing 2001; Duit 
2002; Thelen 2000, Thelen and Streek 2005), could reveal whether a relation exists between 
the institutionalization process of environmental politics and the subsequent environmental 
performance of states. Analyzing timing and content of the institutionalization of 
environmental politics (i.e. when environmental laws where first enacted, when 
environmental agencies were first set up, and the ratification of international environmental 
treaties) a description of the evolution of environmental institutions in a comparative 
perspective can be performed. In the next analytical step, patterns of convergence and 
divergence in the evolution of environmental institutions can be linked to policy outcomes. A 
set of environmental institutionalization data for 38 countries can be found in Weidner and 
Jänicke (1997, 2000). Based on nation-wise case studies, a rich data set consisting of dates for 
the seven different aspects of environmental institutionalisation (environmental ministry, 
national environmental agency, national environmental plan, environmental framework law, 
environmental article in the constitution, and a national council of environmental experts) is 
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provided. This data holds potential for in-depth analysis of historical institutional effects on 
environmental performance. 
  
The second institutional route builds on theories that emphasise the pivotal role of the 
quality of institutions. The quality of institutions is argued to be a crucial factor for explaining 
variations in governance and economy, insofar that just, trusted, impartial, uncorrupted, and 
universal institutions are strongly correlated with societies with higher levels of human well 
being, democratic participation, and economic growth (North 1990, Rothstein, 2003; Newton, 
1999, Olson, 1996). Well-functioning institutions—in terms of transparency, predictability, 
rule of law and low levels of corruption—alleviate problems of collective action by providing 
a structure of rules and sanctions within the institutional realm, thereby lowering the risks of 
engaging in cooperation for all actors. The second route introduces indicators of overall 
institutional quality, such as the Governance Matters III & IV data set developed by Kaufman, 
Kraay and Mastfruzzi (2003), in order to assess the institutional climate in the countries 
studied. In general, a higher institutional quality is expected to be positively associated with 
better environmental capacity. States plagued by weak and corrupted institutions fail to solve 
problems of large-scale cooperation in most other policy areas (Rothstein, 2003), and we 
therefore have strong reasons to expect similar effects when it comes to the capacity of 
addressing the large-scale collective dilemmas of environmental degradation. If A is to 
participate in a large-scale cooperative effort, A will want to know that there is an institutional 
structure in place to secure cooperation of B, C, and all other unknown persons. Being the 
only one (or one of very few) recycling your household waste in the long run seems pointless 
to most people, and when institutional structures supporting cooperation are lacking or weak, 
levels of cooperation will be lower. Furthermore, the overall institutional climate of a society 
could be assumed to be highly influential for the possibilities of small-scale cooperative 
efforts and institutions. Constructing and maintaining institutions for collective action should 
be easier in a society where rule of law, accountability, and an uncorrupted and open civil 
service prevails. Much in the same way as stable and open institutions seem to be a 
prerequisite for economic growth and accumulation of wealth, management of natural 
resources can be thought to be dependent on a benign institutional framework for long term 
success (c.f Robbins 2000). Furthermore, the overall institutional climate of a society could be 
assumed highly influential for the possibilities of small-scale cooperative efforts and 
institutions. Constructing and maintaining institutions for collective action should be easier in 
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a society where rule of law, accountability, and an uncorrupted and open civil service 
prevails.  
 
The dark side of institutions 
There is an additional circumstance that needs commenting on before proceeding. 
Ultimately, good institutions have benign effects because they facilitate cooperative 
behaviour among agents. By reducing insecurities lodged in interaction with other agents, 
institutions cause an overall reduction of transaction costs (North 1990). Thus, good 
institutions make cooperation cheaper. This is why institutions are thought to cause higher 
levels of economic well-being, since more cooperation increases the overall level of 
transactions and thus wealth. As argued above, a similar function of institutions can be 
expected in the case of managing natural resources as this task requires large-scale 
cooperative behaviour of agents. The problem is that the destruction of natural resources also 
requires cooperation among many actors, stable institutional frameworks for transaction, 
protection of property rights, uncorrupted officials, and so on. Consequently, more ‘effective’ 
degradation of natural resources might also be facilitated by good institutions. Similarly, the 
discussion on social capital has long acknowledged that social capital can have bad as well as 
benign consequences for overall social welfare. Margret Levi’s (1996) reminder about the 
possibility of “unsocial capital” and Woolcock and Narayan’s (2000) distinction between 
“bonding” and “bridging” types of social capital serve as important correctives to the 
temptation to equate social capital with the production of good things in general (c.f Portes 
1998). When it comes to economic growth, the assumption of (even minimally) rational 
actors also entails an assumption that actors will strive to maximize their wealth, which in a 
situation of stable institutions will lead to overall higher levels of welfare. However, we 
cannot as easily assume that rational actors will strive to protect the environment, or to 
internalize environmental costs in the presence of good institutions. Thus, we might assume, 
for instance, a waste recycling scheme to function more efficiently in societies with higher 
levels of social capital and high-quality institutions, but we cannot assume that such a 
cooperation-facilitating and transaction cost-lowering mechanism will produce the decision to 
implement the waste recycling scheme in the first place. Thus the transaction cost explanation 
of the effects of social capital and institutional quality cannot serve as the default account for 
why these factors can be expected to have a beneficial effect on environmental protection.    
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Measuring the environmental performance of states: heroic 
assumptions and crude simplifications.3 
There are without doubt large differences between countries with respect to how they 
manage their (and others’) natural resources (c.f Jänicke & Weider, 1997, 2003; OECD, 
2003), although, as Scruggs points out, states tend to handle different environmental problem 
with roughly similar levels of efficiency (Scruggs 2005). Nevertheless, in order to understand 
the social dynamic causing this variation, the central problem arises of how to obtain 
comparable and valid measures of environmental performance. The term “environmental 
performance” is deliberately chosen; analytical focus is placed on understanding how political 
and social factors both cause and remedy environmental degradation, as well as on identifying 
factors underlying better management of natural resources and reduction of environmentally 
harmful practices. An overall prerequisite for an environmental performance indicator should 
thus be that it reflects the action taken (or not taken) in relation to environmental 
management. As environmental performance was defined in terms of internalizations of 
environmental costs, indicators must furthermore reflect costly efforts to combat 
environmental degradation. Costly is here used in the most general sense, including monetary, 
political, and organisational types of costs. 
 
Earlier attempts at producing cross-national indicators of sustainability have primarily 
focused on absolute estimates of environmental impact as grounds for comparison between 
countries. Well-known international “sustainability benchmarking” data collections such as 
the State of the World reports by Lester Brown and the Worldwatch Institute, the Ecological 
Footprint developed by Wackernagel et.al (2000), and the Environmental Sustainability Index 
(ESI) and the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) data sets compiled by World 
Economic Forum, Yale University, and CIESIN are examples of this approach. The 
underlying rationale for these indicators is to rank countries on how far off from a state of 
hypothetical sustainability they at present are. Sustainability is defined theoretically and then 
assessed through multiple indicators measuring resources use, emissions, and the state of 
natural systems within each country. Keeping tabs on the development towards (or from) 
sustainability might be an useful approach in many respects, but as Neumayer points out, the 
main problem is that there is no universally accepted definition of what sustainability means. 
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 The phrase “heroic assumptions and crude simplifications“ was coined by Neumayer in a review article of 
different approaches towards estimating environmental performance (Neumayer 2004:141).   
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In turn, this leads to widely diverging estimates between different indicators: “For example, 
some indicators tell us that most countries, particularly the developed ones, have no apparent 
problem with sustainability, whereas others suggest that the economies of many countries, 
and the developed ones in particular, are clearly unsustainable.” (Neumayer 2004:139).   
 
By contrast, environmental performance of states can be estimated in terms of relative 
efforts to address environmental problems, i.e. changes in variables measuring various aspects 
of environmental impacts.4 This approach has the advantage of producing more valid 
measures of the parameter in question (internalization of environmental costs) as changes in 
an indicator can be thought to reflect some sort of effort carried out with the purpose of 
reducing environmental impacts. This approach does not tell us very much about the overall 
sustainability of a certain state, but it does give an indication of how much political and 
monetary capital a certain state is willing to invest in a better environment – in other words, 
how much a state is capable or willing to internalize previously externalized costs. 
An apparent drawback of this approach is that not all changes in environmental impacts 
are due to conscious efforts to reduce environmental pressures. Reductions in, say, emissions 
of a harmful substance, can be caused by a cognisant attempt to improve the state of the 
recipient in question, but it can also be caused by things such as industrial restructuring, the 
invention and adoption of new technologies, economic downturns, and so on. The problem is 
that there is no way of differentiating between all these factors and political efforts aimed at 
reducing that particular type of pollutant when interpreting cross-national patterns of changes 
in environmental indicators. Variations in economic performance can to some extent be 
compensated for statistically, but many other sources of error cannot. On the other hand, this 
is also true for the obvious alternative – absolute measures of environmental impact—and is 
therefore not by itself necessarily a disqualifying weakness of relative measures.   
 
Another problem with this approach stems from the fact that there is no universal 
definition, applicable to all societies, of what is to be counted as an environmental problem. 
Certain problems such as green house gas emissions, dispersion of harmful chemicals, waste 
accumulation, and industrial emissions of sulphur dioxide are more likely to be found in more 
economically advanced societies, whereas deforestation, soil degradation, and biodiversity 
loss are more common in the least developed countries. This raises a problem of internal 
                                               
4
 This approach is used by Scruggs (1999, 2003) and Jahn (1998) when constructing overall indexes of 
environmental performance. 
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comparability (Gerring 2003), as not all environmental problems can be assumed to be 
equally difficult to address in all countries. For instance, combating biodiversity loss might be 
a lot more difficult than reducing green house gas emissions in a country such as Mali, 
whereas the very opposite might hold true for Germany. Furthermore, what is to be 
considered a reflection of better environmental performance – reducing green house gas 
emissions by 2 % in Germany or the protection of 2 % of endangered species in Mali? 
 
Estimating environmental performance of states is different from measuring the state of 
the environment within states. The most basic reason for this difference is that the state of the 
environment within a certain nation state is only partially (and sometimes not at all) related to 
societal activities within that state. A basic distinction should therefore be made between 
variables measuring the state of environmental systems (e.g. forest cover, species diversity, 
ground water levels, concentrations of toxins in a recipient) and variables estimating 
environmental policy outputs (e.g. emissions reductions, waste recycling levels, energy 
efficiency). The crucial difference between these two types of estimates is that environmental 
state variables can only partially be attributed to societal causes, whereas policy output 
measures are wholly dependent on societal causes (albeit in a very complex manner). For 
example, differences between countries in threatened bird species as a percentage of total 
number of known species does say something about differences in the level of biodiversity, 
but the problem is that species loss can have many different causes in different contexts. 
Some of these causes are definitely related to biodiversity management (or lack thereof) such 
as land use policies, forestry policies, and control of toxic substances, but other factors also 
influencing species diversity are climatic variations, ecosystem dynamics, pest outbreaks, and 
the evolutionary succession of species. Moreover, globalization of environmental degradation 
might mean that ecological effects in a given country can have its origins in another country 
(e.g. acidification in Scandinavia caused by industrial emissions in Germany and the United 
Kingdom), which means that using acidification of Swedish lakes as a indicator of  Swedish 
environmental performance might not accurately reflect the environmental performance of 
that country. Thus, for the purpose of estimating environmental performance, this means that 
policy output variables have an overall higher degree of validity, as changes in theses 
variables over time must be attributable to some sort of societal change. Table 1 summarizes 
the preceding discussion and gives examples of potential indicators of institutional quality, 





Table 1 A framework for analyzing environmental performance of states. 
 






- Institutional quality 
- Trust, institutional trust, 
organizational membership. 
- Environmental institutions 
- Democratic quality 
 
GM 3 data set 
WVS 3-4 
Jänicke & Weidner 1997, 2000 
GM 3 data set, Polity 4 
(2) Policy outputs 
 
- Pollution abatement expenditure 
- Participation in international treaties 
- Agricultural subsidies 
- Forest certification 
- Change point-source emissions 
- Change diffuse-source emissions 
- Waste recycling rates 
- Protection of natural habitats 
 
EES/OECD; ESI 2005 data set; Geo Data 
Portal; World Development Indicators 
 
 












To sum up, I have argued that scientific knowledge of environmental politics in a comparative 
perspective is, although richly investigated in case-studies, lacking in terms of general 
explanations of variation in environmental performance. Conversely, the few large-N studies 
performed on the topic have typically been of exploratory and non-theoretical character, and 
have thus made limited contributions to the understanding of environmental governance in a 
comparative perspective. In order to provide a theoretical underpinning it was then posited 
that the task environmental politics can be understood as one of internalizing externalisations 
of environmental costs, a task which in turn requires addressing multiple and large-scale 
collective action dilemmas. Consequently, environmental performance of states can be 
defined as the extent to which a state has internalized previously externalized environmental 
costs. This definition raised the question of how to operationalize and measure environmental 
performance. First, a distinction was made between variables measuring the state of the 
environment and variables estimating environmental policy outputs, of which the latter type 
was argued to be preferable due to better validity in relation to the definition of environmental 
performance. Here it was argued that changes over time for different indicators of 
environmental performance would provide better estimates than would measures of absolute 
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environmental impacts, as the purpose is not so much measuring how good an environment a 
state enjoys, but rather to investigate how much it tries to address environmental problems. In 
explaining variations among nations in the extent to which they have internalized 
environmental cost institutional quality, institutional legacies, social capital were singled out 
as important explanatory factors. This assertion was based on theoretical works and empirical 
findings from other policy areas suggesting that these factors are highly influential when 
addressing large-scale collective action dilemmas. However, unlike the case of human well-
being and the creation of economic wealth, high-quality institutions and high levels of social 
capital cannot a priori be assumed to have only beneficial environmental effects; factors 
facilitating cooperation can be also be used for more effective depletion of natural resources. 
An important caveat is thus that social capital and institutional quality can only be understood 
as indispensable prerequisites for, but not causes of, a more ambitious environmental 
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